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THE "ESSENTIAL FACILITIES" DOCTRINE
IN THE SUNLIGHT: STACKING PATENTED
GENETIC TRAITS IN AGRICULTURE
JOSEPH M. PURCELL, JR.t
INTRODUCTION
Genetic engineering is fast becoming a major part of
agriculture in the United States and abroad. Worldwide, some
300 million acres of farmland are planted with biotechnological
crops, including more than 150 million acres in the United
States.' While genetic engineering has the potential to increase
the quality and quantity of crops, some scientists have expressed
health and environmental concerns about the use and regulation
of genetically modified crops.'
Genetic research has found great use for conferring
resistance to herbicides and insects. In the United States, an
estimated eighty-five percent of corn, eighty-eight percent of
upland cotton, and ninety-one percent of soybeans planted in
2009 had herbicide-resistance and/or insect-resistance traits.
One such trait is Roundup Ready-manufactured by Monsanto
Company-which confers resistance to the widely used herbicide
t Senior Staff Member, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St John's
University School of Law; B.S., 2005, University of Virginia School of Engineering
and Applied Science. Professor Keith Sharfman provided me indispensable advice
and encouragement, for which I thank him..
' See CLIVE JAMES, INT'L SERV. FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, BRIEF No. 39: GLOBAL STATUS OF
COMMERCIALIZED BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2008, at 4 tbl.1, 6 (2008),
available at http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/39/download/isaaa-
brief-39-2008.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Zachary Lerner, Comment, Rethinking What Agriculture Could Use:
A Proposed Heightened Utility Standard for Genetically Modified Food Patents, 55
U. KAN. L. REV. 991, 991-92 (2007) (arguing that patent law should regulate
genetically modified foods by considering sustainability, public health, and the
environment in its concept of utility).
3 NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ACREAGE 24-25 (2009),
available at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/Acre//2000s/2009/Acre-06-30-
2009.pdf
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glyphosate.4 Roundup Ready is by far the most widely used
herbicide-resistance trait in the United States and glyphosate
the most-used herbicide.5
Developers of genetic traits for use in agriculture receive
patents for their work, and courts consistently have upheld
these patents' validity and licensing practices. Although
Monsanto does not manufacture the seeds containing Roundup
Ready, it does require that farmers using the seeds acquire a
license from Monsanto. These licenses provide that the farmers
will not save seeds-that is, they will not use seeds produced by
Roundup Ready plants to plant next year's crop and instead must
purchase new seeds and licenses each year. Monsanto has
successfully defended its patents and enforced these license
requirements on several occasions.'
Monsanto has also received legal attention from antitrust
authorities for so-called "anti-stacking" provisions in licenses for
Roundup Ready. "Stacking" in this context means the
combination of different genetic traits in a single seed.'
Monsanto's licenses prohibited the stacking of Roundup Ready
with traits produced by companies other than Monsanto. When
Monsanto sought to merge with Delta Pine and Land Company,
the largest producer of cottonseed in the United States, the
Department of Justice (the "Department") filed suit against the
two companies to enjoin the merger.' The Department claimed
4 Complaint at 3, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:09-cv-
00686 (E.D. Mo. May 4, 2009).
6 TIMOTHY KIELY ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY
SALES & USAGE: 2000 AND 2001 MARKET ESTIMATES 14 tbl.3.6 (2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oppOO001/pestsales/Olpestsales/usage200l_2.htm; R.E.D. Facts:
Glyphosate, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 1993), http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrdl/
REDs/factsheets/0178fact.pdf.
6 E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (filed Oct. 28, 1993) (for the Roundup Ready
trait in soybeans).
7 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1335-39 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299-300 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Monsanto has
also successfully enforced its patents against at least one farmer in Canada whose
crops acquired the trait by unintentional, wind-driven pollination. See Stephanie M.
Bernhardt, High Plains Drifting: Wind-Blown Seeds and the Intellectual Property
Implications of the GMO Revolution, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 1-3, 5
(2005).
8 See Sorting Out the Facts Behind Stacks, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.
com/newsviews/Pages/gene-stacks-facts.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
' Complaint at 1-2, United States v. Monsanto Co., No. 1:07-cv-00992 (D.D.C.
May 31, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f223600/223677.pdf; see
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that it sought an injunction because Monsanto's licenses for
Roundup Ready in cottonseed contained an anti-stacking
provision."o Delta had licenses for Roundup Ready that allowed
stacking, while most other licensees were either prohibited
from stacking or subject to severe penalties for doing so.
Therefore, Delta uniquely offered Monsanto's competitors in trait
development an opportunity to stack their traits with Monsanto
and thereby compete with Monsanto." This opportunity could
have disappeared with a merger between Delta and Monsanto.
The Department settled with the companies on the condition that
Monsanto remove these provisions.1 2
That controversy took place in the cottonseed market, but
anti-stacking provisions have become prominent in the soybean
market as well. Recently, Monsanto filed suit against a major
competitor to enforce an anti-stacking provision in a license for
Roundup Ready; 13 the defendant responded with antitrust
counterclaims.14 E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company
("DuPont") developed its own herbicide-resistance trait, called
Optimum GAT ("OGAT"), and it began to market seeds stacked
with Roundup Ready. OGAT conferred resistance to several
herbicides, including glyphosate, but it would not work
appropriately unless stacked with Roundup Ready.1" DuPont
argued that Monsanto's enforcement of the license and refusal to
allow stacking constituted a violation of antitrust law."
The intersection between the fields of patent law and
antitrust law has long been an area of controversy. One
antitrust doctrine in particular is potentially important in the
realm of synthetic genes: Under the essential facilities doctrine,
"a monopolist has a duty to provide competitors with reasonable
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 25 (2006) (authorizing suits by the government to
enjoin certain mergers).
1o Complaint, supra note 8, at 8.
n See id.
12 See Final Judgment at 9-10, United States v. Monsanto Co., No. 1:07-cv-
00992 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f239400/
239476.pdf.
13 See Complaint, supra note 4, at 5, 17-18.
14 See Defendants' Amended Answer and Counterclaims at 18, Monsanto Co. v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 4:09-cv-00686 (ERW) (E.D. Mo. July 10, 2009).
15 See Complaint, supra note 8, at 13-14. DuPont claimed that its product,
without being stacked with Roundup Ready, would pose unacceptable risks to
farmers. Id.
16 See Defendants' Amended Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 13, at 63.
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access to 'essential facilities,' facilities under the monopolist's
control and without which one cannot effectively compete in a
given market."" Arguably, the Roundup Ready trait for
soybeans is an essential facility to competition in the field of
traits generally. This Note argues that the essential facilities
doctrine should apply to synthetic gene patents; while the facts
ultimately will determine the outcome of this particular case, the
doctrine should be available to courts in order to create and
maintain a thriving market for genetic traits having both
innovation and consumer choice. Part I discusses the history and
legal status of the "essential facilities" doctrine, which has long
been controversial in the United States, but has received
acceptance abroad. Part II explores the applicability of the
doctrine to patents, which remains in question. In addition, Part
II presents the arguments made for and against the "essential
facilities" doctrine and argues that patents do not deserve special
protection from the Sherman Act or essential facilities
jurisprudence. Finally, Part III argues that a patent on a
synthetic gene should, under appropriate conditions, be
considered an "essential facility" subject to compulsory licensing.
I. SHERMAN ACT BACKGROUND AND THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
DOCTRINE
The Sherman Act, sometimes called the "Magna Carta of free
enterprise,"" prohibits anti-competitive conduct by firms acting
in concert and by powerful monopolists. The statute is short and
broad; antitrust doctrine in the United States is predominately
the product of judicial decisions. Section A provides a brief
introduction to Sherman Act jurisprudence; Section B discusses
the "essential facilities" doctrine; and Section C discusses a
controversial case that applied the doctrine under questionable
circumstances.
" Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 107 (2d
Cir. 2002) (citing S. Pac. Commc'ns Co. v. AT&T Co., 740 F.2d 980, 1009 (D.C. Cir.
1984), rev'd sub nom. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
" E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
[Vol. 85:12511254
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A. Sherman Act Introduction
Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations . . . ."1" Read strictly, this
statutory language would ban every binding contract. The
Supreme Court has held that only unreasonable restraints of
trade violate the Act.20 Nevertheless, the law deems certain anti-
competitive activities per se violations without respect to their
reasonableness. These include price fixing,2' horizontal division
of markets,22 group boycotts,23 and, under appropriate
circumstances, tying-that is, the practice of conditioning the
sale of one product on the sale of another.24
Section 2 of the Sherman Act outlaws monopolization,
attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize.2 5
Courts have rejected the notion that monopolization means no
more than the status of monopoly. Rather, the statute bans only
conduct in furtherance of monopoly. 26 The two sections, though
distinct, have some areas of overlap. Some activity that is
unilateral in substance may fall within the purview of Section 1
because of a technical multiplicity of actors. Tying would be one
example: Although the seller unilaterally forces the buyer-and
likely plaintiff-to accept a product she does not want-or would
prefer to get elsewhere-in order to purchase a product she does
want, the violation is a contract and therefore falls within
Section 1. On the other hand, violations of Section 1 can
form the predicate conduct for monopolization or attempted
monopolization."
19 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
20 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-68 (1911).
21 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) ("Under the
Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se.")
22 Topco, 405 U.S. at 607-08.
23 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
24 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984).
25 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
26 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
27 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427-28 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Monopolization requires monopoly power, or "the power to
control prices or exclude competition in a relevant market."2 8
Defining the "relevant market" is difficult and often outcome-
determinative. It "is composed of products that have reasonable
interchangeability for the purposes for which they are
produced-price, use and qualities considered."2 9 One measure of
interchangeability is cross-elasticity of demand-that is, the
degree to which a change in the price of one product affects
demand for another-but this measure is not exclusive or even
necessary.3 0  Under appropriate circumstances, a court will
define a relevant product market to include only a single
patented invention." A court must also determine a geographic
market, or "the area of effective competition."32
B. The Essential Facilities Doctrine
Generally, a firm may choose with whom it will or will not
deal without incurring liability under the antitrust laws.33 This
freedom extends, for example, to a manufacturer refusing to deal
with distributors who do not adhere to the manufacturer's
suggested resale price.3 4 The Supreme Court has been reluctant
to limit this principle.35  But, concerted refusals to deal may
violate Section 1 under appropriate circumstances, as in group
28 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
29 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
3o Compare id. at 380 (approving of cross-elasticity as measure), with Grinnell,
384 U.S. at 592-93 (ignoring cross-elasticity as a measure of interchangeability).
31 See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
2 United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320, 327 (1961)) (discussing the geographic market in the context of a merger).
13 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). After that case,
this has become known as the "Colgate doctrine." E.g., Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co.,
753 F.2d 416, 425 (5th Cir. 1985).
34 Pierce, 753 F.2d at 425-26 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984)). This is distinct from an agreement by the retailer to sell at a
particular price. The distinction was for years crucial: the latter amounted to price
fixing, which was illegal per se. Such agreements are now judged under a rule of
reason. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882
(2007).
" See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004) ("We have been very cautious in recognizing such exceptions [to the
right of refusal to deal], because of the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the
difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single firm.").
1256 [Vol. 85:1251
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boycotts.3 6  Moreover, a unilateral refusal to deal is protected
only "[in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly."3 7
The essential facilities doctrine is one implementation of
this refusal-to-deal jurisprudence.38  A prominent example of its
application came from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co. 39  The
defendant in that case, AT&T controlled local telephone
distribution and interconnection facilities.4 0 MCI sought to
compete with AT&T in providing long-distance telephone service
but required access to AT&T's networks in order to do so. AT&T
refused reasonable access. 41  The court applied the doctrine of
essential facilities and upheld a jury determination of liability.4 2
As the court stated, the elements of an essential facilities
claim are fourfold: "(1) control of the essential facility by a
monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably
to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing
the facility."43  Of course, these elements depend on the
"essentialness" of the facility, which presents a high bar for an
antitrust plaintiff-but how high is a matter of disagreement: To
one court, "[a] facility is 'essential' only if control of the facility
carries with it the power to eliminate competition in a
downstream market,"4 4 while another has held it "sufficient if
duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible and if
denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap on potential market
entrants.""
36 See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
7 Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307. But see Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118 (2009) (citing Colgate but omitting that important corollary).
38 The doctrine also applies to Section 1, though its more natural application is
Section 2. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
This Note will refer to the doctrine as the "essential facilities" doctrine or "essential
facility" doctrine, with or without quotation marks.
3 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982).
1o Id. at 1096.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1132-33.
43 d.
44 Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir.
1991)).
45 Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992.
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Thus, in MCI, the elements applied as follows. First, AT&T
controlled the local telephone networks and had an obvious
monopoly in that regard.46 Second, MCI could neither practically
nor reasonably duplicate it. It would have been economically
infeasible and wasteful to build competing local telephone
networks, and regulators probably would have denied
authorization to do so.4 7 The jury found as matters of fact the
third and fourth elements: AT&T denied access to MCI but could
feasibly have provided it." The essentialness of AT&T's facilities
to MCI is self-evident: Long-distance telephone service is
worthless without the ability to connect it to its users.49
As another example, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit applied the doctrine to railroad tracks in Delaware &
Hudson Railway Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp."o The Defendant
in that case controlled large lengths of railroad track, while the
Plaintiff owned about one tenth the span." On most routes
between eastern Canada and the mid-Atlantic United States,
only the Defendant controlled all the tracks. The Plaintiff
needed to connect with and use the defendant's tracks in order to
provide such routes.52 The Defendant clearly controlled the
tracks, and building new long-haul tracks would have been
infeasible.53 The Defendant could feasibly have granted access,
as it had done in the past.54 Access was not denied outright;
however, offering it on unreasonable terms sufficed for the third
element, so the essential facilities doctrine applied.5
The purpose of the doctrine, as stated by the court in MCI, is
to prevent a monopolist in one market from extending its
monopoly to another. 6 This makes it much like other antitrust
46 MCI Commc'ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1093-94.
47 Id. at 1133.
48 Id. (reviewing a jury determination to that effect).
4 See id. at 1094.
50 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1990).
5' Id. at 176.
52 Id. The relevant market was that for newspaper shipping between those two
places. Id.
13 Id. at 179.
5 Id.
15 Id. at 179-80.
6 See MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983)
(citing Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973)).
1258 [Vol. 85:1251
STACKING PATENTED GENETIC TRAITS
doctrines, for example, tying." Commentators have justified this
doctrine on several grounds. One has grounded the doctrine on
industries with network effects and natural monopolies that
provide access to necessities.5' Network effects involve demand-
side economies of scale leading to winner-take-all scenarios; for
example, more nodes on a telephone or railroad network make
each note more valuable. Denying access to such a network,
therefore, reduces those economies of scale for consumers."
Others have justified the essential facility doctrine on the theory
of "infrastructure."o Infrastructure resources, they say, generate
positive externalities that militate for nondiscriminatory access.*
The debate as to the doctrine's value is lively.
C. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co.
One case that has received widespread criticism is Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co. 62  In Aspen, the
Plaintiff and Defendant owned all of the skiing operations in the
area of Aspen, Colorado-the Plaintiff one and the Defendant
three. For years, they had an arrangement whereby customers
could buy an area pass that would allow them to ski at any of the
four facilities. . The Defendant then pulled out of the
arrangement after negotiating year after year for terms less
favorable to the Plaintiff.63 The Defendant even refused to sell
passes to the Plaintiff at retail prices so that the Plaintiff could
reproduce the multi-area pass arrangement.64 The Plaintiff sued
and won in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on the
" See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1218 (3d Cir. 1976)
("[T]he concept of leverage upon which the illegality of tying is premised [is that] the
seller with market power in one market uses that power as a 'lever' to force
acceptance of his product in another market.").
" See Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and "Essential Facilities": From Terminal
Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L. REV. 557, 558-59 (2009).
* See id. at 560-63.
60 Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities,
75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4 (2008).
61 See id. Frischmann and Waller focus on a demand-side definition of
infrastructure, which they say tends to have three characteristics: non-rivalrous use;
demand driven by downstream productivity depending on it; and use as an input to
"a wide range of goods and services, including private goods, public goods, and/or
non-market goods." Id. at 12.
62 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), affd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
63 Id. at 1512-13.
64 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 593-94.
12592011]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
theory that the area pass was a facility essential to competition.5
The Supreme Court affirmed, but did not rely on the essential
facilities doctrine.6 6
Aspen does not fit well into commentators' justifications for
the essential facilities doctrine. Nothing about ski mountains or
area ski passes gives rise to demand-side economies of scale the
way phone or railway networks do; nor do they fit the definition
of natural monopolies or provide what most would consider
"necessities." Likewise, the facilities at issue do not fit the
definition of "infrastructure," for there are no real downstream
markets or social benefits associated with skiing; thus, Aspen
may be a false positive under the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit's essential facilities theory. 8
A simpler problem with Aspen is that the market in which
the Defendant had market power was the same market in which
the Plaintiff was trying to compete. Therefore, the case does not
fall in line with the doctrine's purpose as stated in MCI and
recognized by some commentators. MCI involved a vertically
integrated monopolist; AT&T controlled both local and long-
distance lines, and local lines can be seen as inputs to long-
distance ones. Put another way, local and long distance
telephone lines are complementary products, not substitutes.0
The same could be said of railroad tracks: Short-haul tracks and
long-haul tracks, very much like local and long distance phone
lines, complement each other. In each case, then, the Defendant
provided both complementary and substitute products. In Aspen,
on the other hand, the monopolist was horizontally integrated,
6 Aspen, 738 F.2d at 1520-21.
6 See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44.
67 See Lao, supra note 57, at 567, 570-72.
66 See Frischmann & Waller, supra note 59, at 47-48.
6'9 See Paul D. Marquardt & Mark Leddy, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and
Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to Pitofsky, Patterson, and Hooks, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 853-55 (2003) (noting Aspen as the "single precedent ... which
clearly deviates from the 'two market' logic of the essential facilities doctrine" and
criticizing the case).
7o In economic terms, the difference between complementary and substitute
products can be quantified by cross-elasticity of demand. When a product's price
increases, demand for a complementary product will decrease, while demand for a
substitute will increase. Anita Regmi & James L. Seale, Jr., U.S. Dep't Agric., Cross-
Price Elasticities of Demand Across 114 Countries, TECHNICAL BULLETIN No.
1925, iii-iv (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/TB1925/
TB1925.pdf.
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controlling three of four competing ski lifts." The Plaintiffs and
Defendant's products did not appear to be complementary, only
substitutable. Yet, the success of the all-area pass suggests that
the same products were both complementary and substitutable.
Because some consumers preferred them together rather than
apart, the market for multi-area passes could be viewed as
distinct. This viewpoint provides some basis for harmonizing
Aspen with other cases. In any event, the Supreme Court's
affirmance on other grounds leaves doubt as to the value of the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's opinion.
D. Is It Dead?
The Supreme Court precedents upon which courts have built
the essential facilities doctrine never mentioned or expressly
approved of the doctrine.72 Adding to the controversy
surrounding the doctrine, the Supreme Court noted recently that
it had neither adopted it nor refuted it: Reversing a
determination of liability under the theory, the Court stated,
"This conclusion would be unchanged even if we considered to be
established law the 'essential facilities' doctrine crafted by some
lower courts . . .. We have never recognized such a doctrine, and
we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here."7 3
This evasive statement has led some to question whether the
theory remains viable."
II. "ESSENTIAL" PATENTS
Courts have said little about whether or when a patent can
be considered an essential facility to competition under antitrust
law. Courts have, however, had occasion to address antitrust
liability premised on a monopolist's refusal to deal in a patented
invention. This is highly relevant because the Supreme Court
has ruled that firms with no antitrust duty to deal also have no
antitrust duty to deal on favorable terms." Thus, Section A
" Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520 (10th
Cir. 1984), affd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
72 See Lao, supra note 57, at 563-64.
7 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S.
398, 410-11 (2004) (citations omitted).
74 See, e.g., Frischmann & Waller, supra note 59, at 9 (calling Trinko "the near
extinction of the [essential facilities] doctrine in the Supreme Court" but noting that
the relevant portion was dicta).
7 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1119 (2009).
2011] 1261
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discusses the legal connection between patents and the refusal-
to-deal doctrine generally, as well as the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit's jurisprudence and its potentially broad
influence. Section B then discusses the limited law on essential
facilities and patents, reviews the scholarly arguments for and
against the doctrine's applicability, and takes the position that
patentees need no special protection from the doctrine.
A. Refusing to Deal in a Patent
Whether refusing to deal in a patent or patented invention
could result in antitrust liability has given rise to at least one
circuit split. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.," imposed
such liability. Kodak manufactured and sold patented photocopy
machines; naturally, it also manufactured and sold replacement
parts, which were also protected by patents. Independent service
organizations seeking to compete in the aftermarket repair of
Kodak photocopiers sued Kodak for refusing to sell them its
patented replacement parts. 7 After finding a prima facie case of
liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the court proceeded
to consider whether Kodak had a valid business justification for
its refusal to deal.
Patent rights were relevant to this inquiry: Discussing at
length the tension between Section 2 and a patentee's broad
exclusionary rights, the court concluded that Kodak's patents
gave it "a presumptively valid business justification for any
immediate harm to consumers." The presumption could be
rebutted by a showing of pretext, involving the subjective
motivations of the patentee; the Plaintiffs had made such a
76 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
n Id. at 1201. Copyrights also were involved; this Note does not address them.
7 See id. at 1212. Kodak had attained monopoly power and engaged in apparent
exclusionary conduct. Id.
79 Id. at 1218 (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d
1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)).
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showing, and the jury had implicitly rejected Kodak's
presumptively valid justification."o As noted below in Section B,
the facts show that the court could have applied the doctrine."
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed with
Kodak when presented with a very similar set of facts in In re
Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation (Xerox).82
Xerox, the antitrust Defendant, refused to sell patented
replacement parts for its high-volume copiers to independent
service organizations, except to service copiers that they owned.
The court rejected the rebuttable-presumption scheme adopted
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Kodak, refusing
to inquire into the subjective motivations of Xerox." The court
went on to say, "In the absence of any indication of illegal tying,
fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the
patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude
others . . . free from liability under the antitrust laws."8 Only if
the anticompetitive effect of the patentee's refusal to deal is
"illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant" will the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit go further with the
antitrust claim.86
B. A Patent as an Essential Facility
Against the backdrop of the Kodak-Xerox circuit split lies
the essential facilities doctrine. Both cases leave open the
question of the doctrine's application to patent rights. The Kodak
court dismissed the doctrine as unnecessary to resolve the case;
liability could attach regardless of essential facilities. Xerox,
so Id. at 1218-20. The district court failed to instruct the jury as to this
presumption and thereby abused its discretion, but the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit deemed the error harmless. Id. at 1218.
81 Interestingly, the court considered the essential facilities doctrine at length
but did not apply it, solely because the trial court had not instructed the jury in that
fashion. Kodak argued that its liability could be predicated only on an essential
facility theory, but the court rejected the proposition because Supreme Court
precedent did not require it. Id. at 1209-11. Indeed, the Supreme Court had never
expressly applied the doctrine. Therefore, Kodak suggests that the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit would apply the doctrine to a patent case given the
opportunity.
82 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
* Id. at 1324. Like Kodak, this case also involved copyrights. Id.
* Id. at 1327-28.
* Id. at 1327.
86 Id. at 1328.
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under very similar facts, refused liability without addressing the
doctrine. Would the court then find liability based on the
doctrine?
The court in Kodak arguably could have applied the essential
facilities doctrine; indeed, the defendant argued in favor of its
application as the exclusive path to liability." First, Kodak was
a monopolist and controlled the essential facility-its patented
replacement parts-which were absolutely needed to compete in
the aftermarket for service of Kodak machines. Second, the
plaintiffs could not duplicate the facility; manufacturing the
replacement parts would have infringed Kodak's patents. Third,
Kodak denied the facility. Fourth, Kodak feasibly could have
sold its parts to independent servicers; otherwise, there would
have been a legitimate business justification for its refusal to do
so, an issue the court addressed." Applying the doctrine here
would not run contrary to essential facilities cases' generally
common two-market theme; the independent servicers sought to
compete in the market for service, not the market for parts."
Likewise, the doctrine could apply to the facts of Xerox if the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was willing to adopt it
with respect to patents. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has addressed the essential facility doctrine only once-
neither directly nor in perfect relation to patent law. In
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,9o Intergraph, an original
equipment manufacturer,91 sued Intel for infringing Intergraph's
patents and for refusing to continue supplying Intergraph with
proprietary information regarding Intel's microprocessors as well
as pre-release samples of them. These benefits, reserved for
"strategic customers," allowed Intergraph to design its products
in advance of the microprocessors' release. The case was before
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because of the patent
infringement claims; the claimed "essential facilities" under
antitrust law were the proprietary information and pre-release
87 See supra note 80.
" See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
8 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1211
(9th Cir. 1997) (distinguishing the Supreme Court's Aspen decision on those
grounds).
' 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
9' Original equipment manufacturers in this context are "producers of various
computer-based devices, who adapt and integrate the microprocessors into products
that are designed and sold for particular uses." Id. at 1349.
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samples." Intel was not altogether refusing to deal or license;
rather, it withheld "strategic customer" status from Intergraph.9 3
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to apply
the essential facility doctrine chiefly because Intergraph and
Intel were not competitors. Moreover, the court considered the
extension of essential facility jurisprudence to special customer
privileges unwarranted;9 5 but it did not address whether a license
to the underlying patents could be considered an essential
facility. Thus, the question remains as to whether the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit would apply the essential
facilities doctrine at all, much less to a patented invention.
"The [Supreme] Court has held many times that power
gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a
patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if
'a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand
his empire into the next.' " This is exactly the purpose of the
essential facility doctrine: to prevent a monopolist in one
market from extending its monopoly into another." Patents
are meant to confer monopolies on their holders-to "secur [e]
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their . . . Discoveries."" Patent law creates incentives for
92 Id. at 1356.
* Id. at 1359.
* Id. at 1357-58.
* Id. at 1358.
* The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's view is more important than
the Ninth's. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over patent claims, and this kind of antitrust claim often arises as a counterclaim to
patent infringement litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2006). The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit applies its own law to issues arising under its
exclusive jurisdiction. That court has held that, with regard to patents, the issues in
its exclusive jurisdiction exceed substantive patent law and extend to the question of
whether the patent law confers immunity from antitrust law on a patentee. See In
re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067-68 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); see generally Claudette Espanol, Comment, The Federal Circuit:
Jurisdictional Expansion into Antitrust Issues Relating to Patent Enforcement, 2
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 307 (2005). On the other hand, the Federal Circuit does not
have appellate jurisdiction if the patent claims are counterclaims and there are no
patent claims in the complaint. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830-31 (2002).
" Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29
(1992) (quoting Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611
(1953).
9 MCI Commc'ns Co. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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inventors to innovate by guaranteeing that they will see the
fruits of their labor. Without such a guarantee, only altruists-
upon whom a capitalist society can hardly rely-would make the
large investments often required for successful research and
development. In areas with especially high fixed research and
technology costs and especially low variable costs, innovation
might cease entirely without patent protection and would decline
considerably if that protection were weakened. 100
However, the same is true of real and personal property.
Economists justify property rights generally as necessary to
encourage and allow investment. Farmers would not turn soil or
plant seed without the exclusive right to harvest and sell
the ultimate crop. Developers would not build forty-story
skyscrapers without the exclusive right to lease use and lease the
space therein. Automakers would have no business if their
products were subject to use by whomever wished to drive them.
Property rights in any resource are thus needed to justify
substantial investment in it.o
Courts have applied the essential facilities doctrine to
exactly the kind of economic situations that justify patent
protection-that is, areas of high fixed investment costs and
lower variable costs. AT&T, no doubt, incurred great expenses
building its telephone network, but it was required to share it
under the doctrine. 102 Gathering and writing about news, as does
the Associated Press, involves only investment with virtually no
variable costs-with respect to sharing-but the Supreme Court
has made the Associated Press share access to its benefits. 103
" See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of
Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1261-63 (2009).
101 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed.
2011).
102 MCI Commc'ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132-33; see supra Part I.A.
103 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1945). The Supreme
Court did not apply the essential facilities doctrine, but the case has been used as
legal justification for the doctrine. See, e.g., Mid-Tex. Commc'ns Sys., Inc. v. AT&T
Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1387 n.12 (5th Cir. 1980); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d
843, 856 n.34 (6th Cir. 1980). But see Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet
in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 842-44 (1990) (arguing that
Associated Press stands only weakly, if at all, for the essential facilities doctrine).
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Additionally, building a sport stadium involves enormous
investments in design and construction, but a stadium has been
deemed an essential facility.'o
One might argue that all patents are essential facilities,
since they seem to exhibit all of the elements of the doctrine."'
When a patentee refuses to license or sell an invention, (1) the
patentee controls the invention by virtue of its legal right of
exclusion-and is a monopolist by virtue of the patent; (2) the
plaintiff cannot reasonably-legally-duplicate the patented
invention, because that would constitute infringement; (3) by
assumption, the patentee is refusing access; and (4) the patentee
feasibly can provide access simply by licensing the patent or
selling embodiments thereof.o0
The doctrine, however, would actually not cover many
patents. First, and perhaps most importantly, not all patents are
controlled by monopolists. While patentees have exclusive rights
to their own inventions, an individual invention does not form a
relevant product market if other products are reasonably
interchangeable with it. If the patentee cannot control the price
of his invention without losing business to other firms selling
other products, the patentee is not truly a monopolist; therefore,
the essential facilities doctrine does not restrict his actions.
The second element, duplicability, would also preclude the
doctrine's application to some patents. Though it may constitute
infringement to duplicate the patented invention exactly or very
closely, another inventor may create a competing product that
does not infringe. This practice, sometimes called "designing
around" a patent, is common. Indeed, the promise of patent
protection itself produces incentives to create a superior
competing product.o' However, designing a competing product
may be infeasible or socially wasteful. Similarly, it may be
104 See Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(applying the essential facilities doctrine to a dispute involving RFK Stadium in
Washington, D.C.).
10 See Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 68, at 857. Marquardt and Leddy
advance this point in support of their argument that the essential facilities doctrine
should not be applied to patents in Aspen-type scenarios-that is, where the plaintiff
seeks access to the patented invention as essential to compete in the same market as
the invention. Id. at 847-48. In that scenario, essentialness is almost a given.
o' See MCI Commc'ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132-33; Marquardt & Leddy, supra
note 68, at 850.
107 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 300 (2003).
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wasteful to build a second stadium in a city when an existing one
can be utilized more often or more efficiently, just as it would be
uneconomical to build a second set of local telephone networks
when the existing ones are not congested; thus the essential
facilities doctrine had mandated access. 0 s Thus, in appropriate
circumstances, mandating access to one technology may divert
research efforts into complementary products, fostering, rather
than chilling, innovation. 109
Even if a patented invention meets these requirements, it
must truly be essential to competition in another market in order
for a court to force sharing-unless, that is, the doctrine were
applied in the Aspen context. In Aspen, the essential facility in
question-a pass to ski at all of the ski facilities in Aspen-was
necessary for competition in the same market in which the
monopolist held market power-skiing in Aspen.110 Applying the
doctrine to patents in the same manner as in Aspen could
arguably undermine the patent system entirely.1"' But, even
scholars wary of the doctrine's application to patents provide
reasons to disregard Aspen as anomalous. The case, in this
regard, goes against the weight of authority, and the Supreme
Court in its affirmance placed great weight on the longstanding
agreement between the parties-had the monopolist merely
refused to enter an agreement with its competitor rather than
terminating one, the Court might have reversed." 2 The Aspen
doctrine might therefore be reserved to cases in which a longtime
patent licensee depended on its license to stay in business.
III. SYNTHETIC GENE PATENTS AS ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
As noted above, genetic engineering is an important part of
modern agriculture in the United States. Stacking, or the
combination of traits within a single seed, allows for the
possibility of crops containing multiple fruits of genetic research.
The application of antitrust law and the essential facilities
10 See MCI Commc'ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132-33; Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992-93.
109 See Lao, supra note 57, at 593-94 (arguing this point in industries tending
toward winner-take-all scenarios).
110 See Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1513
(10th Cir. 1984), affd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
n1 See Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 68, at 848-49.
112 See id. at 853-55.
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doctrine to stacking and its prohibition may therefore play a
large role in the future of agricultural research, development,
and consumer choice.
The essential facilities doctrine as applied by the MCI court
has four elements: (1) a monopolist's control of an essential
facility, (2) lack of the ability to reasonably duplicate the facility,
(3) denial of the facility, and (4) feasibility of providing it."' That
first element includes essentialness, a key part of the doctrine.
This Part explores each of these elements and its implications,
including an analysis of the anomalous Aspen in context.
A. Relevant Markets
A monopolist is one with monopoly power, "generally defined
as the power to control prices or exclude competition in a
relevant market.""4 Determination of market power depends on
the definition of the market. Monsanto obviously has monopoly
power in its Roundup Ready trait, conferred legitimately by
its patent. Roundup Ready is a synthetic trait that confers
resistance to a widely used herbicide, glyphosate."1 DuPont has
alleged an antitrust market of herbicide-resistance traits for
soybeans in the United States, claiming that Monsanto controls
over ninety-nine percent of that market."6 Farmers have widely
adopted Roundup Ready seeds in this country; approximately
ninety-one percent of all plantings have the trait, and farmers
use glyphosate more than any other herbicide."' There appear to
be no products reasonably interchangeable with the trait;
therefore, the market should include only that trait.
Defining the relevant market as one that only incorporates
the Roundup Ready trait may severely undermine the patent.
The court in Broadcom hesitated to define a market around a
single patent-or group of patents held by a single firm-resting
its decision to do so on the invention's incorporation into an
113 MCI Commc'ns Corp., 708 F.2d at 1132-33.
114 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
n. Complaint, supra note 4, at 3; see also R.E.D. Facts: Glyphosate, supra note 5
("Glyphosate is among the most widely used pesticides by volume.").
116 Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims at 6, Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., No. 4:09-cv-00686 (ERW) (E.D. Mo. June 16, 2009), available at
http://www2.dupont.com/MediaCenter/en-US/assets/downloads/pdf/20090616DuPo
ntCounterclaim.pdf.
1' See ACREAGE, supra note 3, at 24-25; KIELY, supra note 5, at 14.
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industry standard. 1 8  There exists no industry standard in
herbicide resistance traits in soybeans. There may be an
equivalent external factor, however: the widespread use of
glyphosate. To the extent that farmers have adopted it as a
"standard" herbicide, a trait with resistance to some other
herbicide, without resistance to glyphosate, may not succeed.
Regardless, the existence of an industry standard should be
viewed, not as a requirement, but as a significant reality; the
standard effectively excluded the possibility of competition from
other technologies. A market can be proven otherwise."19
B. Duplicability
DuPont's own experience shows some level of infeasibility in
duplicating the facility at issue. Its trait, Optimum GAT, was
meant to be a stand-alone trait. Only after development did
DuPont decide that it needed to be stacked with Roundup Ready
in order to form a competitive product. 20 Therefore, it would be
appropriate to consider the relevant market as defined and to
determine that competitors cannot reasonably duplicate
Roundup Ready. As discussed, the same can hold true in other
scenarios.
Beyond DuPont's own impracticability, one can inquire into
the possibility of social waste. Monsanto, having created
Roundup Ready, is likely in a better position to create herbicide-
resistant traits than competitors. Indeed, it already has
developed a second generation of Roundup Ready products.12 '
From a social standpoint, then, it may be more productive to
encourage competitors to invest in different kinds of traits.
Without the intervention of antitrust law, however, anti-stacking
licenses could prevent others from achieving success with their
compatible, but not competing, traits.
118 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314, 316 (3d Cir. 2007).
119 There once was a presumption that patentees possessed market power. The
Supreme Court recently overruled this presumption and held that market power
must be proven. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
120 See DuPont Lawsuit Timeline, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/
newsviews/Pages/dupont-lawsuit-timeline.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
121 Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 114, at 37.
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C. Denial of Access
Monsanto did not deny outright a license to Roundup
Ready. Instead, it placed restrictions in its licenses that
prohibited its stacking. Offering access on unreasonable terms,
such as an exorbitant price, qualifies as denial for essential
facilities purposes. 122 Given that the anti-stacking provisions in
Monsanto's licenses had the clear effect of restricting competition
in stacked traits, it stands to reason that these licenses count as
denial for the purposes of essential facility analysis.
D. Feasibility
Strictly speaking, it would be easy for Monsanto to provide
the appropriate access to its Roundup Ready patent. DuPont
evidently appropriated the technology and incorporated it into its
own without any cooperation from Monsanto beyond the original
license and whatever information was required to make that
transaction effective.1 23  Simply canceling the anti-stacking
provision in its license would supply access.
There may be economic issues with regard to feasibility,
however. A patentees' right of exclusion is meant to enable
innovators to recover the costs of developing their inventions. 1 24
It is theoretically possible that weakening that right by
mandating access, even with reasonable royalties, will interfere
with the inventor's ability to recover his investments, thereby
weakening ex ante incentives to innovate. This problem could be
incorporated into the feasibility analysis. Alternatively, one
commentator has proposed a defense to monopolization where
the exclusionary conduct is "reasonably necessary to attain
tripartite innovation,"2 5 where tripartite innovation comprises
development, recovery of investment, and circumvention of
122 See Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 179-80 (2d
Cir. 1990).
123 See DuPont Lawsuit Timeline, supra note 120 (announcing stacked product).
124 See Leslie, supra note 99, at 1261-62.
125 Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox Through
Tripartite Innovation, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1100 (2003).
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patent bottlenecks-blocking patents. 126  Either solution could
serve as a last line of defense to ensure that innovation is not
excessively stifled-if that should be the goal. 127
The Supreme Court, in cases that had been argued under
essential facility theories below (both of them telecom cases), has
expressed some concern over the feasibility of the remedy-
forcing sharing. A court imposing an antitrust remedy should
not take on responsibilities akin to the daily activities of a
regulatory agency.128  Patent licensing should not raise these
concerns as strongly, since the license grant should end the need
for the firms to deal further with one another.
E. Essentialness
Is Roundup Ready truly "essential" to competition in a
market? The aspect of the Monsanto-DuPont dispute involving
traits that serve purposes other than herbicide resistance best
invokes the traditional doctrine. According to DuPont, there is
an emerging market for "output traits" that affect the quality of
crops rather than the quantity produced, and which form a
separate market.' 9 One example is a trait that increases the
amount of oleic acid in soybeans to reduce the quantity of
harmful trans fats; DuPont had developed such a trait, while
Monsanto had one under development."s DuPont also claims
that input traits like Roundup Ready are sufficiently important
that output traits are not commercially viable without them.a13
This restriction invokes the essential facility doctrine in the
traditional two-market context, as in MCIl32 and Delaware &
Hudson.3 3  Oleic acid output traits would not compete with
herbicide resistance traits; rather, the two traits would
complement each other, forming a superior product together, just
as local and long-distance telephone networks or short and long-
126 Id. at 1048-49.
127 See id. at 1058-62 (positing that innovative efficiency is more important than
allocative efficiency).
128 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1121 (2009).
129 Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 114, at 25-26, 30-31.
130 As of June 2009. Id. at 30-3 1.
m Id. at 31.
132 MCI Comnc'ns Co. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982); see supra
notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
13 Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1990); see
supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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haul railway networks do. Moreover, the output traits could not
succeed without the input traits, just as long distance and long-
haul tracks require their local and short-haul counterparts, while
the reverse is not true. Therefore, if Monsanto refused to license
Roundup Ready for stacking with competitors' output traits, that
would resemble the leveraging theme present in most essential
facility cases.134
Applied to this scenario, the essential facilities doctrine can
foster, rather than stifle, innovation in the field of synthetic
traits. "By giving rivals that which is needed to compete in
complementary markets, essential facilities may unleash
innovation and competition in the complementary markets." 3 5
Meanwhile, it should not reduce the incentive to innovate in
traits likely to become essential facilities, since that status
depends on their very success.136 Open access as such benefits
not only competitors, but the competitive process, and thus
farmers and ultimate consumers as well. 37
The dispute over Optimum GAT, on the other hand, bears a
striking resemblance to Aspen.138 Akin to the skiing companies
in Aspen, Optimum GAT and Roundup Ready are would-be
competitors, except that OGAT cannot compete unless sold
together with Roundup Ready. Both serve the same purpose,
herbicide resistance, but at the same time, when combined, the
whole is greater than the sum of their individual parts.
Moreover, Monsanto, like the defendant in Aspen, refused to sell
its licenses to its competitor even at the same prices charged to
customers. While the cases are not identical, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's opinion suggests that the
essential facility doctrine would require that Monsanto allow
Optimum GAT to be sold in combination with Roundup Ready.
If the Supreme Court opinion in Aspen is read to limit the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's rationale, however, then
the case is less clear. A key concern of the Aspen Court was the
long and profitable history of the agreement between the
134 See Marquardt & Leddy, supra note 68, at 849-53.
15 Lao, supra note 57, at 593.
136 See id.
137 "The antitrust laws . . . were enacted for the protection of competition not
competitors." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
138 Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir.
1984), affd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); see supra Part I.C.
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competitors. Forced sharing within a single market creates
concerns regarding incentives to innovate and invest within that
market. The fact that sharing had been long and profitable in
Aspen convinced the Court that the stronger firm had designs to
put its rival out of business by forsaking short-term profits. In
the essential facilities context, the same facts could strongly
bolster a finding on the feasibility of sharing.
The essentialness requirement, together with lack of
duplicability, circumscribes antitrust liability to very limited
circumstances. If Optimum GAT worked on its own to confer
substantial herbicide resistance, nobody could claim that either
trait was essential to competition in a market for other traits.
Moreover, as noted above, the essentialness of Roundup Ready
depends to some extent on factors external to the patent, such as
the widespread use of glyphosate itself. Properly applied, the
essential facilities doctrine would go no further than to ensure
that no firm captured an entire agricultural market with one key
trait and thereby used its monopoly power to garner market
success for its other traits and suppress those of its competitors.
CONCLUSION
Patentees do not need special protection from the essential
facilities doctrine in antitrust law. The doctrine is sufficiently
limited in that it does not threaten the goals of the patent law
any more than it threatens those of property law generally. The
requirement of a well-defined relevant market prevents the
doctrine from encompassing all patents. Similarly, a showing of
inability to duplicate the patented invention goes beyond patent
infringement, as many patents have competitors in their relevant
markets. As demonstrated by the Monsanto-DuPont dispute,
refusing to apply the doctrine may actually stifle innovation in
the booming field of genetic engineering; applying it could create
a thriving market for agricultural traits. The courts should
adopt the doctrine in the field of synthetic traits, where it will
stimulate both competition and innovation, furthering the
purposes of both patent and antitrust law and enhancing
consumer choice in agricultural products. From there, courts can
bring it to patents at large, where it will do far more good than
harm in fostering and rewarding innovation.
1274 [Vol. 85:1251
